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DIVINE COMMAND, DIVINE WILL, AND
MORAL OBLIGATION
Mark C. Murphy

In this article I consider the respective merits of three interpretations of divine
command theory. On OCT}, S's being morally obligated to <iJ depends on
God's command that S <iJ; on OCT2, that moral obligation depends on God's
willing that S be morally obligated to <iJ; on OCT3, that moral obligation
depends on God's willing that S <iJ. I argue that the positive reasons that have
been brought forward in favor of DCn have implications theists would find
disturbing and that the positive reasons brought forward in favor of OCT2
support only a weak formulation of OCT2 that is indistinguishable from other
theistic moral theories. OCT3 is, however, a distinctive theory that theists have
strong reasons to affirm.

Philip Quinn has usefully distinguished between two sorts of task that the
advocate of a divine command theory of ethics (hereafter OCT) might
engage in: that of defending OCT against the standard (and not-so-standard) objections that have been leveled against it, and that of providing
"good positive reasons" for affirming that theory.' There is a third task
that merits attention, though, and that does not fit neatly into either category: that of specification of what it is that OCT asserts. What does OCT
affirm concerning the connection between God and morality? What precisely are the relata, and what precisely is the nature of the relationship?
This task of determining what specific formulation OCT should receive is,
of course, not unrelated to the other two. Rescuing OCT from objections
may involve the task of specifying that theory more completely or reformulating its fundamental theses; and the particular formulation that OCT
receives is likely to be shaped by the positive reasons there are for acceptance of that view.
Part of the discussion concerning what formulation OCT should receive
has focused on the nature of the relationship between God and morality:
whether the connection between certain states of affairs involving God's
will or God's commands and certain states of affairs involving moral
requirements should be construed as a relationship of identity, or causation, or perhaps supervenience. As far as is possible, 1 shall not deal with
the issue of the relationship between these states of affairs. Rather, I want
to focus on the issue of what states of affairs involving God should be
taken to be fundamental to OCT.2 Consider, for example, the following
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three distinct theses concerning moral obligation that a defender of DCT
might affirm:
(DCT1) The state of affairs of S's being morally obligated
to <I> depends on the state of affairs of God's commanding
S to <I>
(DCT2) The state of affairs of S's being morally obligated
to <I> depends on the state of affairs of God's willing that S
be morally obligated to <I>
(DCT3) The state of affairs of S's being morally obligated
to <I> depends on the state of affairs of God's willing that S
<1>3

Call DCn a command formulation of DCT; call OCT2 and OCT3 will formulations of OCT. Now, DCT1, DCT2, and DCT3 are not very fine-grained formulations of OCT's theory of moral obligation. 4 They are, for example,
silent on the issue of what the dependence relation consists in, whether it is
identity, or supervenience, or a causal relationship of some sort. Their
silence on this issue is intentional, though, for I want to focus on the relata
rather than the relation. 5 Should the defender of DCT affirm a command
or a will formulation of OCT? If a will formulation is affirmed, what is the
act of willing that is relevant?
OCTI

DCT1 is considered the standard formulation of DCT both by those
sympathetic to and by those critical of divine command theories of ethics.
Robert Adams, whose work was crucial to the rebirth of this type of ethical
theory, clearly endorses the command formulation of DCT over will formulations." In spite of the impeccability of its credentials as the traditional
formulation of OCT, though, it is worthwhile to ask whether good reasons
can be found for preferring this formulation of DCT.
It seems to me that the best argument in favor of Dcn over DCT2 and
DCT3 turns on a purported analogy between the way that voluntary
human activity generates obligations and the way that voluntary divine
activity generates obligations.7 When humans impose obligations either on
themselves or on others, these obligations are the result of the performance
of certain speech-acts. Consider two examples. First, promises: I may will
to give you a dollar, but I am not obligated to give you the dollar unless I
make a promise to do so. Second, orders: a sergeant may will that a private scrub the latrine, but the private is under no obligation to scrub the
latrine until the sergeant orders him or her to do so. It is important to note
that it is not just that the act of will is not sufficient for the existence of the
obligation in these cases; it is not even necessary, and the promise and the
order can produce obligations even if the will is opposed to what is
promised or ordered. I might lack the will to give you a dollar, and might
even have a will that is opposed to it, yet my promise to give you a dollar
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nonetheless generates an obligation to hand it over. The sergeant might
lack the will that the private scmb the latrine, and might even have a will
that is opposed to it (perhaps the sergeant cares not for matters of hygiene,
or wants the private to disobey so that he or she can be brought up on
charges of insubordination), yet the order to scmb the latrine still generates
an obligation to do the job.
Humans impose obligations on themselves and others by way of
speech-acts. Mere willing is not sufficient, and is not even necessary. If
God's obligation-producing activity is analogous to that of humans, then
we might take Dcn to be the preferable formulation of DCT, for it makes
moral obligation depend on God's commands, which are divine speechacts. It seems, though, that accepting this analogy would have disturbing
implications for divine command theorists regarding God's capacity to
impose obligations.
To make clear why this is so, I will need to say some things about how
ordinary human speech-acts generate obligations. I take it that it is a commonly held view that while a purely empirical set of conditions can be laid
down for what counts as the making of a promise or the giving of an order
(that certain words are uttered, that the utterer of the words possesses certain beliefs and intentions, and the like), both the status of these empirically-specifiable acts as promises or orders and the status of these acts as
engendering obligations depend on the obtaining of institutional facts. B
The mles that constitute the familiar practice of promising, that is, both
determine when a valid promise has been made and imply that a promise
is an undertaking of an obligation; and the mles that define the relationships between military superiors and inferiors specify what counts as a
non-defective order and make it the case that when a non-defective order
has been issued the person to whom it has been issued is bound to comply
with it. If there were not these constitutive mles, not only would it not be
the case that promises and orders impose obligations, it would not be the
case that there are promises and orders at all.
If human speech-acts generate obligations in this way, then there is reason to doubt the analogy between God's obligation-imposing activity and
human obligation-imposing activity. It seems that if the fact of analogy is
to give support for DCTl, then God's speech-acts must impose obligations
in the same way that humans' speech-acts impose obligations. While I
think that one kind of worry that attends this proposal can be shown to be
less weighty than it might initially appear, another shows that this purported analogy would have consequences that are intolerable for most
defenders of DCT.
One worry that could immediately be pressed against this conclusion is
that even if God's commands generate obligations in the way that human
speech-acts do, the obligations are nothing like the moral obligations that
the defender of OCT is concerned to uncover. While Searle, for example,
defends the view that one can derive from the fact of a promise the existence of an obligation to perform, he freely admits that he does not show
that the obligation in question is moral, and he even suggests that there are
reasons to believe that the promissory obligation is not a moral obligation."
Since Searle's derivation is not specific to promises but could be applied to
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all obligations resulting from speech-acts, the same point could be made
about obligations generated by orders or commands. Rawls, upon discussing the constitutive conventions that govern the practice of promisemaking, notes that those rules are on a par with the rules of games, and do
not become morally binding except by way of a true moral principle that
entails that adherence to those rules is morally required. 10 Thus, we could
not rest by explaining moral obligation in terms of God's commands, but
would have to invoke an independent moral principle which implies that
adherence to obligations resulting from divine commands is morally binding. Perhaps even more directly to the point is an argument made by John
Simmons against the view that the moral obligation to obey the law can be
explained in terms of positional duties or institutional requirements.
Contrary to the views of those who hold that anyone who uses the term
"law" correctly or knows what citizenship is recognizes that citizens have
an obligation to obey the law, Simmons argues that this putative obligation, if there is such a thing, is of no moral weight; positional duties are not
moral duties, and institutional requirements are not moral requirements. 11
Similarly, one could argue that even if God's speech-acts do generate obligations like promises and orders do, these are not moral obligations, and so
even if the analogy between human and divine speech-acts holds, this
analogy provides no reason to affirm the view that DCTI is the preferable
formulation of OCT.
Searle, Rawls, and Simmons agree that the obligations that arise as a
result of institutional facts are not moral obligations at all. This might be
thought to be a decisive objection to the defense of DCT1: for if no speechacts generate moral obligations, then God's speech-acts do not generate
moral obligations. I think, though, that this objection is not decisive.
Simmons' argumentative strategy derives its success from the fact that
without begging any questions he can rely on a neutral and unproblematic
account of moral obligation with which he can effectively contrast certain
institutional requirements. But we are precluded from employing a strategy of this sort by the foundational nature of the enquiry that we are
engaged in. We are not concerned, as Simmons is, with asking whether
particular institutional requirements impose moral obligations. We are
concerned, rather, with asking whether moral obligation could itself be one
kind of institutional requirement, that is, obligation that results from
speech-acts that God performs. We cannot assume a contrast without begging the question.
It might help to imagine the following form of life, and how in this form
of life the obligations generated by God's commands have the foundational place that is often associated with moral requirements. Suppose that
there is a human community that is thoroughly theocentric. One way that
this theocentrism is manifested is that within this community there is an
institution, similar in some respects to our institution of promising, called
the institution of "divine commanding." Divine commanding is itself an
act that can be empirically-specified: it occurs paradigmatically when God
utters the words "I command that ..." and thereupon predicates some
future action to some person, and God possesses certain beliefs, intentions,
etc. By using this form of speaking, God intends to perform an act quite
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different than that of merely reporting a wish or want, and in virtue of the
constitutive rules of the institution anyone who asserts that 5 has been
divinely commanded to <iJ is committed to the view that 5 is obligated to <iJ.
These "divine command obligations" are ultimate in the following sense:
all other obligations that persons within that community see themselves as
being bound by are in some sense regulated by divine command obligations. 50, it is the case that even if one recognizes that he or she is under a
promissory obligation by making a promise, the normative force of this
obligation is referred to a divine command obligation, perhaps an obligation that one adhere to his or her promissory obligations. In this community divine command obligations are ultimate; there are no obligations of a
kind more fundamental than they to which divine command obligations
could be contrasted to their detriment. The point is not that this is an
attractive view of morality. Rather, the point is that with regard to such a
society it does not seem a decisive objection to assert that no matter what
the institutional requirements are, it is clear that they are not moral requirements. Within such a form of life, the obligations generated by Cod's
speech-acts seem to fill the role of moral requirements.
The worry about making the case for God's obligation-engendering
activity depend on an analogy ,\Tith human obligation-imposing activity is
not that it requires an absurd view of morality, but rather that (as the story
I had to tell makes clear) it makes God's capacity to obligate dependent on
the existence of certain highly specific forms of community that are conventional and for the most part do not exist at all. The worry is that on
such a view God's obligation-producing power is objectionably contingent.
God could not impose obligations on the persons that do not inhabit this
form of community, and that means that most persons would be insusceptible to having obligations imposed on them by Cod.
My view is that acceptance of the analogy between human and divine
obligation-engendering activity as support for ocn would commit one to
a view of God's power to impose obligations which the defender of OCT
would find objectionably contingent. One might respond, though, by
questioning my claim that certain institutional rules would need to be in
place for God to be able to impose obligations. "Forget the institutional
rules," the objector might say. "Why should we not simply hold that it is a
moral principle that those to whom God has issued a command are bound
to obey that command?" One could say this, I suppose; but note that this
proposal does not enjoy the analogical support that the earlier defense of
OCT1 enjoyed. The analogy between the human and the divine imposition
of obligations, were it successful, would militate in favor of OCTl over
OCT2 and OCT3. But if one merely asserts that there is a moral principle
that one ought to obey God's commands, it is open to ask why one holds
that view rather than the view that (perhaps) there is a moral principle that
one ought to obey Cod's will. The analogy supports the command formulation of OCT over the will formulations. If one discards the institutional
rules picture, though, one must discard the analogy, the rationale for preferring ocn to OCT2 and OCT3.
I think, then, that the analogical argument for ocn is not successful.!2
But there is an argument for ocn that does not depend on any appeal to
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analogy between human and divine obligation-imposing activity. The content of God's will is, to put it mildly, very difficult to know without God's
making it known by way of His commands. But it might be thought that
what we are morally obligated to do must be knowable, so that unless God's
will is made known by His issuing commands, one cannot be under any
moralobligations. il Support for this view might be drawn from the "ought
implies can" principle. It might be thought that since acting on moral
requirements is not possible unless one is able to know of their existence,
there is reason to prefer a formulation of OCT that connects moral obligations to God's knowable commands rather than God's unknowable will.
There are at least two things that can be said in response to this argument. First, it should be noted that the formulation of the "ought implies
can" principle that is relied on in this argument is itself questionable. In
order for the argument to be successful in establishing that command is
even a necessary condition of obligation, the principle must be interpreted
so that being bound by an obligation to (jl implies that one can (jl under the
description "fulfilling an obligation." It is only by interpreting the principle to have this implication that one can deduce that one must be aware of
the status of an action as obligatory if there is to be an obligation to perform it; only by giving this sort of interpretation of "ought implies can" can
the knowability requirement be defended as an a priori condition that any
account of moral obligation must satisfy. But it is not obvious to me, at any
rate, that it could not be the case that one ought to (jl yet one is in a position
such that one cannot know that one ought to (jl. Rather, this strikes me as
simply a rather innocuous form of realism about moral requirements. It
should be noted, however, that to say that one is under a moral requirement that one cannot know about in present circumstances is not to say
that one is culpable if one does not follow that moral requirement. While
there is on my view little to be gained by denying that there can be obligations that we cannot, in present circumstances, know about, there is much
to be said for the view that one cannot be considered blameworthy (or
praiseworthy) for violating (or adhering to) moral requirements that he or
she was in no position to know about.
Secondly, even if we grant that the truth of "ought implies can" shows
that there is a sense in which moral obligation has to depend on divine
command within a OCT view, dependence in this sense is not what is at
stake between advocates of OCT1 and advocates of OCT2 and OCT3. It
will be useful to adopt here a distinction employed by Howard Warrender
between grounds of obligation and the validating conditions of obligation."
This distinction between grounds and validating conditions is not, I think,
one that can be spelled out in purely logical terms. The distinction is,
rather, that between a cause, or source, and the circumstances in which a
cause can operate or a source can issue its product. 15 Now, even if the truth
of the "ought implies can" thesis implies that moral obligation in OCT
must depend on divine command, all that would follow is that the expression of God's will is at least a validating condition of moral obligation. But
it seems to me that the dispute between defenders of command formulations and will formulations of OCT is not about the validating conditions
of moral obligation, but rather its grounds. (A defender of a will formula-
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tion could, it seems, affirm that command is a validating condition of
moral obligation without straying at all from his or her thesis.) The positive argument for OCTI that relies on "ought implies can" is therefore not
strong enough to provide reasons to prefer that thesis to OCT2 and OCT3.
The arguments that favor a command formulation of OCT over a will
formulation do not withstand scrutiny. Before we turn to an examination
of the specific will formulations OCT2 and OCT3, we should consider
whether will formulations generically considered have anything to recommend them over the command formulation. We are aided in answering
this question by the fact that both Quinn and Edward Wierenga, who
along with Adams are largely responsible for the revival of OCT, have
noted in passing that on their views it is not divine command that is of fundamental importance for OCT but rather divine will.
Wierenga offers as a justification for preferring will formulations over
command formulations the ability that the former have to solve certain
puzzles, such as that posed by the case of Abraham and Isaac. He writes
that by affirming a will formulation of OCT, the defender of OCT need not
"take God's command that Abraham kill Isaac as indicating God's desire
that some particular act of Abraham's killing Isaac be performed. Rather,
God issued that command to reveal what He really wanted, or to induce
Abraham to do what he really wanted, which was that Abraham, out of a
desire to obey God, prepare to sacrifice Isaac."16 Even if one does not
endorse Wierenga's particular analysis of the case of Abraham and Isaac,
one might think that will formulations have advantages over command
formulations with regard to the implications these formulations have in
cases in which what God commands and what God wills pull apart. OCTl
implies that if God's commands conflict with God's will, then it is God's
commands that dictate morality; and OCT1 implies that if God wills a
human action yet fails to command it, that action is not morally required.
If we think that it is possible for God to issue a command which He wills
us not to adhere to, and that in such cases we would be morally obligated
to follow God's will rather than to adhere to the command, we would have
reason to affirm a will formulation over a command formulation. (Is it
possible for God to test us by commanding something that He wills that
we not do?') We might also wonder whether there might be moral
requirements that God has not told us about yet; OCT2 and OCT3 do not
imply the impossibility of this state of affairs, but OCTI does. (God might
will, for example, that we perform a certain action without being commanded to do so. OCTl implies that it could not be a violation of a moral
obligation not to act in accordance with this will; OCT2 and OCT3 imply
that it could.)
Quinn, on the other hand, does not appeal to puzzle-solving capacities
to justify the preference for will formulations of OCT over command formulations. He writes that he prefers to formulate OCT in terms of divine
will rather than divine command because "it is at the deepest level God's
will, and not his commands, which merely express his will, that determines
the deontological status of actions."IS What QUinn's remark captures is
that God's commands might not seem to be of importance except insofar as
those commands express what God's will is; God's commands are mere
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means to express His will. Now, one might say: there seems to be more of
importance about commands than the expression of will. But if my criticisms of the analogical argument are correct, it will be difficult to show
how God's commands could be more than expressions of His will, except
in very limited and special circumstances.
The rationales provided by Wierenga and Quinn for acceptance of will
formulations of OCT over the command formulation are not, of course,
decisive. To find better reasons for accepting a will formulation, I think
that we shall have to look to the particular formulations OCT2 and OCT3,
and see what grounds for acceptance they present. Before we turn to those
accounts, though, we should note that there is some price to be paid for
accepting a will view over the command view. Quinn takes part of the distinctiveness of OCT to be its affirmation that God's commands do not simply inform us of the existence of certain obligations, but impose the obligations on us. But note that if we decide that it is the will of God and not His
commands that does the work, then we must disagree with Quinn's assertion and hold that according to OCT God's commands are relevant to
morality only in an informative capacity, because they express to us what
the content of God's will is. If we decide on reflection that God necessarily
does not command what He does not will, then we can make the same
claim that many natural law views make, simply that what God says is an
infallible guide to what is morally required. If, on the other hand, we hold
that God might command what He does not will, then a particular one of
God's commands might be among a number of factors that are considered
in order to discern what God wills. This price is small, though, for the
claim about God's commands can be transformed into a claim about God's
will with apparently little sacrifice. One can claim that God's will is not
merely reflective of moral requirements, but is constitutive or productive
of them. And this does seem to capture what the defenders of OCT want
for their view, a view which Quinn occasionally and more accurately calls
"theological voluntarism."
DCT2

OCT2 and OCT3 are versions of theological voluntarism. Both of them
assert that moral requirements depend on God's Will. 19 But they differ in a
crucial respect. DCT2 asserts that the act of will that is relevant is God's
will that some person be bound by a moral requirement to perform a certain action. OCT3 asserts that the act of will that is relevant is sin1ply God's
will that some person perform a certain action. I know of no plausible will
formulation of OCT other than OCT2 and OCT3. If, then, defenders of
OCT reject command formulations, they should accept either OCT2 or
OCT3. But which of these is preferable?
I want to argue that there are good reasons for rejecting OCT2 as the
preferred formulation of OCT. I will first show that OCT2 admits of a
metaethical and a normative interpretation. 20 I will then argue that the positive reasons that have been brought forward in favor of OCT2 support
only the metaethical and not the normative interpretation. I shall show,
though, that the meta ethical interpretation of OCT2 is not distinctive; it
does not adequately distinguish the defender of OCT from defenders of
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other ethical views. While DCT2 can be reformulated so that it is distinctive, this reformulation is ad hoc, unmotivated by any of the positive reasons brought forward for accepting it.
DCT2 asserts that S's being morally required to <I> depends on God's
willing that S be morally required to <1>. But this can be given either a normative or a meta ethical interpretation. On the normative interpretation of
DCT2 - call it DCT2-N - the following normative state of affairs obtains:
all humans are morally required to do what God wills that they be morally
required to do. In virtue of this general moral requirement, particular
actions that God wills that we be morally required to perform become
actual moral requirements. The idea expressed by DCT2-N, that is, is that
humans owe God obedience with regard to what God wills that humans
be required to do. There is a moral requirement on all humans to obey
God's will; the particular moral obligations that humans have are all specifications of this general moral requirement, determinations of what must
be done in concrete circumstances if one is to render this obedience. On
the other hand, the metaethical interpretation of DCT2 - call it DCT2-M
- does not appeal to a general moral requirement that is particularized by
the content of God's will. Rather, the claim is that God creates moral
requirements ex nihilo, that is, out of normative nothingness.
It seems to me that meta ethical and normative versions of DCT2 are easily confounded. The likely source of this confusion is that both of them
imply that if God wills that humans be morally required to <1>, then humans
are morally required to <l>Y But the metaethical and normative versions of
DCT2 differ both in the sort of explanations they provide for the existence
of particular moral obligations and in their implications about what moral
obligations there are. DCT2-N explains particular moral requirements in
terms of another normative state of affairs, that is, the general moral obligation to obey God. DCT2-M explains the existence of particular moral
requirements simply in terms of God's power to actualize normative states
of affairs; no normative states of affairs obtain prior to God's willing. This
difference in explanation also produces a difference in normative implication. Since DCT2-N explains how God generates moral obligations in
terms of the normative state of affairs that one is morally required to obey
God, it follows trivially from DCT2-N that humans are under a moral
requirement to obey God. DCT2-M does not have this implication, however; one can affirm DCT2-M yet deny DCT2-N. It is consistent to hold that
all moral requirements are produced by God out of normative nothingness
as DCT2-M claims, but that those moral requirements are those of (e.g.)
utilitarianism rather than normative divine command theory.
DCT2-M and DCT2-N are distinct theses; neither entails the other?" I
shall argue that the positive reasons that have been brought forward in
favor of DCT2 militate in favor of DCT2-M, but not DCT2-N. Thus, it is the
DCT2-M formulation that should be accepted, if DCT2 ought to be accepted at all. (This is one of those cases in which the specific formulation that a
thesis receives depends on the positive reasons brought forward for
accepting that thesis.)
The reasons that have been brought forward in favor of DCT2 emphasize certain divine attributes which would allegedly be compromised if
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DCT2 were not the case; such attributes include, for example, God's being
both omnipotent and impeccable, God's both having absolute liberty and
being impeccable, and God's possessing absolute sovereignty over creation. While I will later remark briefly on the first two combinations of
attributes,23 I will focus on the third. For the most detailed recent argument
in favor of DCT2, that presented by Quinn, is that an appreciation of the
doctrine of divine sovereignty lends support to DCT2.
The doctrine that God is sovereign over creation is "that nothing distinct
from God is independent of God."2-l The sense of dependence is metaphysical: metaphysical dependence is an asymmetrical relation in which one
state of affairs contributes to the obtaining of another state of affairs. The
doctrine of divine sovereignty, then, asserts that states of affairs that are
distinct" from God's existing are metaphysically dependent on God's willing that they obtain. This interpretation of the doctrine Quinn takes to be a
moderate one. On a weaker view, it is only contingent states of affairs that
are metaphysically dependent on God's will; on a stronger view, all states
of affairs, even those which involve or entail God's existence, are metaphysically dependent on God's willing them. While Quinn disclaims
knowledge of any conclusive arguments for the moderate interpretation,
and professes merely to be following the "generally sound maxim that
good things are apt to be found somewhere in the middle between
extremes,"2!> it nevertheless seems clear why he inclines toward it: it allows
for a fairly robust theological activism 27 while avoiding the strangeness of
the view that something that is logically necessary for God's willing (that
is, God's existing) could nevertheless be metaphysically dependent on it. 2R
Acceptance of this moderate interpretation of the doctrine of divine sovereignty provides support, though, for DCT2. Most states of affairs involving morality are obviously wholly distinct from God's existing. Lying's
being morally forbidden and charity's being morally required are obviously distinct from God's existing, and so if God is sovereign over creation in
this moderate sense then the obtaining of those normative states of affairs
is dependent on God's willing that they obtain. It is clear, however, that
this appeal to divine sovereignty over creation supports only DCT2-M, not
DCT2-N. The doctrine of divine sovereignty does not itself support the
view that any normative states of affairs obtain, and it does not show that
the moral requirements that we are under are the result of a prior moral
requirement to obey God. Rather, the appeal to sovereignty shows only
that God's will must enter into any complete explanation of why a normative state of affairs obtains.
It might be argued, though, that the doctrine of divine sovereignty does
not establish DCT2-M, for there are some normative states of affairs whose
obtaining cannot be shown to depend on God's will by the sort of argument that Quinn advances. Interestingly, one of these normative states of
affairs is that expressed by DCT2-N. Quinn's moderate interpretation of
divine sovereignty shows that moral requirements depend on God's will if
they are wholly distinct from God's existing. But Quinn denies that the
state of affairs described in DCT2-N is wholly distinct from the state of
affairs of God's existing. He writes:

DIVINE COMMAND, DIVINE WILL, MORAL OBLIGATION

13

it might seem that [the thesis that all obtaining states of affairs wholly
distinct from God's existing depend on God's will] is powerful
enough to get us to the conclusion that all obtaining deontological
states of affairs are metaphysically dependent on being willed by
God. But this is not so, for the simple reason that not all obtaining
deontological states of affairs are wholly distinct from God existing.
Consider the state of affairs of obeying God being obligatory.
According to theism, it surely obtains. Yet it seems clearly not to be
wholly distinct from the state of affairs of God existing, because it
apparently both involves and entails God existing. 29
Quinn underestimates the force of the moderate interpretation of divine
sovereignty. Even the moderate interpretation, on my view, implies that
the truth of theses like DCT2-N are metaphysically dependent on God's
will. The reason is that, contrary to appearances, the state of affairs
expressed by DCT2-N is wholly distinct from God's existing.
Consider the following analogous case. Suppose that the state of affairs
of its being morally obligatory to keep promises obtains. This state of
affairs is, I think, wholly distinct from the existence of promises: one can
conceive of its being morally obligatory to keep promises yet no one has
made any; and one can accept that promise-keeping is obligatory while not
accepting that there are any promises out there to keep. What this shows is
that the moral requirement to keep promises is best thought of as not
implying the existence of promises. It seems to me that the same point
applies mutatis mutandis to the case of the moral requirement to obey God.
One can (pace Anselm) conceive of God's non-existence while conceiving
that it is morally obligatory to obey God, and one can accept the view that
obedience to God is morally required while denying that God exists. What
this would show, as in the case of promises, is that the moral requirement
to obey God is best thought of as not implying God's existence.'" But if this
moral requirement does not imply God's existence, then the state of affairs
of its being morally obligatory to obey God is wholly distinct from that of
God's existing." And if this is so, then the moderate doctrine of divine sovereignty does not leave it as an open question whether the truth of DCT2N is independent of God's will. Rather, DCT2-N, whether a contingent or
a necessary truth, is metaphysically dependent on God's will. 32
Theists who accept this moderate account of divine sovereignty, it
seems, are committed to the acceptance of DCT2-M. Before turning to an
examination of the difficulties with DCT2-M as a formulation of OCT, I
want to note briefly that other divine attributes that have been brought forward to support DCT2 militate in favor of DCT2-M rather than DCT2-N. It
might be held that since God is both omnipotent and impeccable, DCT2
must be the case. For if God cannot act in a way that is morally wrong,
then God's power would be limited by other normative states of affairs
were DCT2 not the case. One might make a similar argument with regard
to divine liberty and impeccability: if moral requirements exist prior to
God's willing them, requirements that an impeccable God could not violate, God's liberty is compromised. I shall neither endorse nor reject these
arguments for OCT."4 What is clear from these argument sketches, though,
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is that it is not DCT2-N that is supported by these arguments but rather
DCT2-M. DCT2-M denies the existence of any normative states of affairs
that could exist prior to God's willing them; hence, prior normative states
of affairs could neither constrain God's power to act (thus compromising
His omnipotence) nor constrain God's freedom to act (thus compromising
His liberty). The arguments from omnipotence, liberty, and impeccability
support only a meta ethical, not a normative, version of DCT2.
Quinn's argument from divine sovereignty does support DCT2-M;
indeed, I think that his moderate interpretation of that doctrine provides
for an even more thorough defense of that thesis than Quinn suggests.
Further, I will grant arguendo that the argument sketches that take as their
premises divine omnipotence, liberty, and impeccability can be filled out
so that they imply DCT2-M. The failure of DCT2-M is not the absence of
good arguments in its support. Rather, its failure is specifically as a formulation of DCT: it is simply not distinctive; theists of all ethical stripes can
accept it. It is too uncontroversial with respect to moral matters to be the
preferred formulation of DCT. J5
One way to approach the issue of DCT2-M's lack of distinctiveness is to
note that the argument from divine sovereignty that implies DCT2-M is
not domain-specific. This argument does not show that morality in particular depends on divine fiat; rather, it shows that all states of affairs (apart
from God's existing, and what entails God's existing) depend on divine
fiat. 36 What this means, of course, is that if one defends DCT2-M on the
basis of such an argument, one is committed not only to a divine command
theory of morality, but also to divine command theories of chemistry, biology, physics, mathematics, economics, psychology, and accounting. But
this should make the defender of DCT wonder if DCT2-M really is a strong
enough doctrine. For if DCT2-M itself implies nothing more than that
moral truths depend on God's will only to the extent that, and in the same
way as, truths of physics depend on God's will, it is hard to see, at least
from a theistic perspective, what the fuss is about divine command theories of ethics.
That the doctrine of divine sovereignty implies that truths of morality
might be dependent on God's will only to the extent that truths of physics
are thus dependent suggests, however, that defenders of natural law theory, Kantianism, utilitarianism, and intuitionism should not be at all threatened bv DCT2-M. The natural law theorist can make all of his or her normative~ claims, and can provide an account of how the normative states of
affairs that obtain depend on facts about human nature, while conceding
the whole of the case for DCT2-M. All that he or she has to assert, in addition to the claims that he or she makes about the connections between
human nature and natural law, is that the truth of all of these claims
depends on God's willing: perhaps on God's willing that there be beings
with a certain nature, on God's willing the necessary state of affairs that
those beings with this nature have certain reasons for action, and so forth.
Kantians and classical utilitarians might make similar arguments, the former emphasizing God's willing that there be autonomous rational beings
and the latter emphasizing God's willing that there be beings for whom
(e.g.) pleasure is the good. Intuitionists might simply say that there are nec-
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essary truths about morality, just like there are necessary truths about mathematics; but, like all necessary truths concerning states of affairs wholly distinct from God's existing, their truth depends on God's willing them.
DCT2-M, while non-trivial and perhaps even true, makes a claim vis-avis morality that is simply too weak to serve as a formulation of DCT." Is
there a way to modify DCT2-M to make it a clearly distinctive doctrine?
One way to modify DCT2-M to ensure its distinctiveness would be to add
that the relationship between the act of divine wiI1 and the moral obligation
is a particularly direct one: that is, the state of affairs of 5' s being morally
required to <I> depends directly on God's willing that 5 be morally required
to <1>. What I have in mind here is that the dependence of the moral status of
any act on God's will is unmediated and complete: there are no states of
affairs with any explanatory power that mediate between God's will that an
act be obligatory and the act's being obligatory, and there are no states of
affairs other than God's willing that an act be obligatory that contributes to
the act's being obligatory. Reformulating DCT2-M in terms of direct dependence rather than dependence simpliciter would go quite a way toward
making DCT distinctive. While my imagined natural law theorLst, Kantian,
and utilitarian were perfectly willing to allow that on their views morality
does depend on God's will, their accounts require that there be states of
affairs with explanatory power that mediate between God's willing that a
certain normative state of affairs obtain and the obtaining of that state of
affairs. On (e.g.) the nalurallaw view, these mediating states of affairs are
those having to do with the existence of creatures with a particular nature,
the relationship of that nature to reasons for action, and so forth. We might
say, though, that what makes DCT a distinctive doctrine is that it denies the
existence of any such mediating state of affairs. The only explanation possible for the obtaining of a normative state of affairs like a moral requirement
is that God wills that that state of affairs obtain. 38
The addition of the directness condition does seem to be a plausible way
to make DCT2-M a distinctive moral thesis, about which moral theorists
(even those sympathetic to the moderate interpretation of divine sovereignty) could disagree. The problem with DCT2-M in this modified version is that its appeal to directness seems ad hoc, unmotivated by the considerations that led us to adopt DCT2-M in the first place. Why would one
who wholeheartedly embraces the doctrine of divine sovereignty be tempted to affirm DCT2-M in the direct dependence formulation in addition to
DCT2-M in its unmodified version? In answering this question, it is
worthwhile to consider again the fact that the argument from divine sovereignty does not militate only in favor of a divine command theory of
morality but also in favor of a divine command theory of physics. While
the defender of divine sovereignty should affirm that the obtaining of the
state of affairs dealt with in physics must ultimately depend on the divine
will, is the defender of that view committed to the claim that all explanations of physical states of affairs must be directly and immediately referred
to the divine will? Surely not; God's will that a particular state of affairs
obtain may be carried out by means of the obtaining of other states of
affairs, states of affairs that have of themselves some explanatory power.
But, at least with regard to the considerations raised in the argument from
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divine sovereignty, physical states of affairs are no different from normative states of affairs. If the doctrine of divine sovereignty gives us no reason to hold a direct dependence view with regard to physics, neither does
it give us reason to hold a direct dependence view with regard to ethics. 39
My view, then, is that while the argument from divine sovereignty does
imply DCT2-M, DCT2-M is not a distinctive moral theory; and while
DCT2-M can be modified so that it is distinctive, this distinctive formulation lacks support from the argument for divine sovereignty. We thus lack
reasons to prefer the DCT2-M formulation of OCT.
DCT3

What we have seen so far is that while some reasons can be given for preferring will formulations of DCT to the command formulation, DCT2 is not
itself a distinctive doctrine. We may now turn to DCT3, which holds that
S's being morally required to <p depends on God's willing that 5 <p. While
this view has some obvious attractions - not the least of which is that the
justification "I <p-ed because I thought that it was God's will" is common
currency among theists - I shall postpone for a moment discussion of its
less obvious positive features. What I want to focus on is the sense in
which it could be true that one's being morally required to <p depends on
God's willing that one <p. The difficulty that lurks in specifying such a
sense is this. If one specifies a sense of willing that is too strong, it would
follow that no one could possibly violate a moral requirement;40 if one
specifies a sense of willing that is too weak, it does not seem appropriate to
connect that sense to moral obligation; and it is not easy to specify a sense
of willing that falls between these unacceptable extremes.
The strong sense of "God wills that X" is that in which God intends that
X. But this sense of will is too strong to be connected to moral requirements, for it can be shown that if God intends that X, then X obtains. This
follows from God's being omniscient and God's being rational. ' ] If God is
omniscient, then for every state of affairs R and every time t, God knows
that R obtains at t or God knows that R does not obtain at t. Now suppose
that God intends that R obtain at t. If, in addition to having this intention,
God knows that R does not obtain at t, then God is irrational; for it is irrational to intend some state of affairs that one knows will not obtain. But
God is not irrational. So it must be the case that if God intends that R
obtain at t, then it is not true that God knows that R does not obtain at t;
rather, if God intends that R obtain at t, then God knows that R obtains at t.
If God knows that R obtains at t, then R obtains at t. So, if God intends that
R obtain at t, then R obtains at t; what God intends, God gets.
But this result would show that the sense of will that is employed in
DCT3 cannot be that of intention. For if the state of affairs of S's being
morally obligated to <p depends on God's intending that 5 <p, and if whatever God intends, God gets, then it follows that there has never been an occasion on which a moral obligation was violated. But this is absurd. For if
there are any convictions that are universally held among those who
believe in moral requirements, it is that they are sometimes violated.
We need, then, a sense of willing weaker than that of intending. One
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possibility is to hold that in OCT3 God's willing should be construed as no
more than God's wishing that S <\>, or having some sort of pro-attitude
toward S's <\>-ing. God might have a pro-attitude toward some state of
affairs yet not intend it, so that God's having such an attitude toward a
state of affairs does not guarantee its obtaining. Now, some might find this
proposal objectionable on the grounds that it seems possible that God have
a pro-attitude both toward S's <\>-ing and toward S's refraining from <\>-ing/2
for this possibility would imply the possibility of conflicting moral obligations. Whether one finds this a tolerable result will depend on one's views
on moral dilemmas in general, and I will not press the issue here. But it
seems to me that if we consider the different ways that actions might be
liked by God, God's both liking an action and liking the refraining from
that action is prone to be a ubiquitous phenomenon. But if conflicting
moral obligations are ubiquitous, it becomes unclear why they should be
thought of as obligations, and not just (perhaps) moral considerations, or
moral reasons, or moral goods."
This worry - that God's wishes or wants seem better assimilated to
moral reasons, moral considerations, or moral goods than to moral obligation - can be appreciated even while denying the appropriateness of the
remarks on the ubiquity of conflicting wishes. To wish for some state of
affairs is in part just to think it good in some way; it is not to be set on it,
aiming at it, planning on it. Does it not seem that God's wishes alone lack
the strength or finality that we associate with moral obligation? The point
can be made in a slightly different way. If one associates moral obligations
with God's wishes, what could the weaker notion be in terms of which we
can characterize moral goods? Does it not seem that God's wishes should
be reserved for the explication of moral goodness,"" while a stronger notion
should be put into place to account for moral obligation?
Both the intention reading and the mere wish reading of OCT3 have
positive features. The intention reading of OCT3 seems to provide a strong
enough notion of willing to connect to moral obligation; the mere wish
reading of OCT3 would allow for the possibility that moral obligations are
violated. It seems that we should aim to specify a sense of God's willing
that passes between these extremes, that is, that will be strong enough for
obligation but not strong enough to preclude violation.
Our attempt to pass between these extremes can be aided, I think, by an
examination of Aquinas' own efforts to deal with the question: is it true
that, necessarily, God's will is always fulfilled? The context of Aquinas'
discussion is not moral philosophy, but rather the seeming incompatibility
between God's willing that all humans be saved and the possibility that
some humans will not be saved. While he asserts that in some sense it
must be true that what God wills, God gets - and he defends this claim
with an argument concerning God's status as universal cause - he also
recognizes that there must be some sense in which God's will is not always
fulfilled. God wills that all be saved, says Paul/s yet not all are saved. So
Aquinas finds himself with a task rather similar to that which faces us:
specifying a sense of will strong enough genuinely to be God's will and not
strong enough that God's willing guarantees that the object of God's willing will obtain.
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While Aquinas provides three explanations for how it could be the case
that God wills that all be saved yet not all are saved, only the third is relevant to the solution of the difficulty that DCT3 faces.'" In the third explanation Aquinas, drawing on Damascene, makes a distinction between God's
antecedent will and God's consequent will. It is worth quoting his discussion of this distinction at length:
This distinction [between God's antecedent and consequent will]
must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there
is nothing antecedent or consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, insofar as it
is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. That a man should live is
good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered.
But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it
may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live;
but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged.'7
What Aquinas calls consequent willing is what God in fact wills, for "the
will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they
exist under particular qualifications." Antecedent willing is, on the other
hand, a relative abstraction, for we do not "will simply, what we will
antecedently."" While it is possible, then, that what God antecedently
wills does not come to pass, it is impossible that what God wills consequently does not come to pass. Thus, Aquinas holds that antecedently
God wills that all humans be saved, but He does not will this consequently.
Aquinas' distinction can be used to solve the difficulty that faces the
defender of DCT3. I argued that the intention interpretation of God's willing is too strong, because what God intends, obtains. This seemed unfortunate, because that interpretation seemed strong enough to connect to moral
obligation. But we can say that all that the argument showed was that
God's consequent intentions are all fulfilled. There remains the possibility
that moral obligations can be held to depend on God's antecedent intentions. These might be thought to have the requisite strength to be associated with moral requirements, and since not all of God's antecedent intentions need be fulfilled, this assoCiation would not have the unwelcome
implication that necessarily no moral obligations are violated.'9
Now, if moral obligation is in DCT3 supposed to depend on God's
antecedent intentions concerning human action, and the antecedent intentions on which morality depends can differ from God's consequent intentions (so that moral wrongdoing can occur), then there must be some circumstances which in some way account for the difference between God's
antecedent and God's consequent intentions. (Recall the case of the just
judge in Aquinas' example: antecedently, the judge intends that all
humans live; consequently, the judge does not intend that all humans live.
What accounts for this difference is that some humans are wrongdoers and
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deserving of capital punishment.) But what circumstances could account
for this difference? Deciphering God's seemingly inscrutable intentions
might seem an impossibility here. But there is a set of circumstances to
which it would be natural for us to appeal here, and these circumstances
have to do with human choice. We might say, that is, that God intends
antecedently that humans not murder each other; and so, on this interpretation of DCT3, humans are morally obligated not to murder each other.
But some humans do murder each other. This is possible, because God's
antecedently willing that S <p does not entail that it is the case that S will <p.
Given the actual circumstances of human life - that humans do choose to
murder each other - God does not consequently intend that humans do
not murder each other. (Note well: I do not assert here that God consequently intends that humans murder each other, only that God does not
consequently intend that humans do not murder each other. One might
say, following the traditional insistence on the importance of there being a
world in which free, effective choices can be made, that God consequently
intends that humans make efficacious choices and that God merely accepts
or allows that in some cases this efficacious choosing will result in humans'
murdering each other.)
Before we turn to the question of whether this is a plausible formulation
of DCT, it is worth noting that this interpretation of DCT3 does not suffer
from the failings that beset DCT1 and OCT2. Unlike on OCT1, on OCT3
God's capacity to impose moral obligations is not objectionably contingent,
depending on a very specific set of institutional facts. Rather, what is relevant in a divine command is that God is expressing His antecedent intentions regarding human action. And, unlike DCT2, OCT3 is clearly a distinctive and controversial moral doctrine. A variety of moral views, even
moral views articulated within a theistic framework, would balk at the
notion that morality depends in this way on God's intentions.
I mentioned at the beginning of this section that one of the merits of
DCT3 is that it is simply common currency among theists that one's actions
can be justified by appealing to the fact that God wills that one perform
those actions. The antecedent intention interpretation of DCT3 shows how
this sort of view could be sustained. But there seem to me to be several
other points in favor of this formulation of DCT; and I will conclude this
paper by discussing four such points. The first has to do with the range of
moral reasoning techniques that are sanctioned by OCT3; the second has to
do with OCT3's ability to provide a satisfying account of the distinction
between prima facie and ultima facie (or "all things considered") moral obligations; the third has to do with the fact that DCT3 entails certain commonly
held and quite fundamental deontic principles; and the fourth has to do
with the attractive picture of the moral life that is suggested by the particular interpretation of OCT3 that I have defended.
One thing that makes DCT3 attractive as a formulation of DCT is that it
sanctions a wide range of reasoning in the forming of moral judgments.
Consider in this regard the contrast between OCT1 amd DCT3. Suppose
that the defender of OCT1 has access to all of the divine commands available to him or her. It seems that the kind of moral reasoning that the
defender of OCT1 can use to determine how to act morally in particular
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circumstances is limited to determining what actions are necessary to carry
out those commands. But note that the defender of DCT3 might have, in
addition to this sort of means-end reasoning, other kinds of moral thinking
at his or her disposal. Since divine commands are, on this view, relevant
merely as expressions of God's will, one can rely on tenets of rational willing to extrapolate God's will in other matters from His express commands.
The primary example of such thinking that comes to mind here is analogical reasoning, which is widely used in judicial reasoning to come to legal
judgments by extrapolating from explicit expressions of legislative will.
Affirmation of DCT3 also makes available an account of the source of the
distinction between prirna facie and ultima facie moral obligations. According
to DCT3, moral obligation depends on antecedent intentions. Antecedent
intentions are, however, relative abstractions; and since there are various
levels of abstraction to which we can ascend in the ascription of such intentions, there will be a variety of levels of antecedent intentions. We may
characterize one's ultima facie moral obligations - those moral obligations
by which we are bound, all things considered - as depending on God's
antecedent intentions concerning one's actions which take into account all
circumstances of action apart from what one actually chooses to do. One's
merely prima facie obligations, on the other hand, depend on those of God's
antecedent intentions concerning one's actions that abstract even more completely from the particular circumstances in which one must choose what to
do. For example: it could be the case that God possesses antecedent intentions both that Kant not tell lies and that Kant do what is necessary to protect innocent life. We may therefore say that Kant is under prima facie moral
requirements to refrain from lying and to protect the innocent. Given a
more specific description of Kant's choice situation, however - that there is
an axe-murderer at the door inquiring as to the whereabouts of his potential
victim - God's less abstract antecedent intention, which takes into account
all relevant circumstances other than the agent's actual choice, might be that
Kant lie in order to protect the axe-murderer's potential victim. If so, Kant's
all-things-considered moral obligation is to tell the falsehood. The connection between moral obligation and antecedent intention, together with the
variety of levels of abstraction at which antecedent intentions can be
ascribed, suggests a natural way of explaining the distinction between prima
facie and ultima facie moral obligations.
DCT3 is also attractive in its fruitfulness: it is capable of providing
defenses of several commonly held deontic theses that DCn cannot.
Consider the following three moral theses: (1) if one is morally obligated to
<p, and \jf-ing is a necessary means to <p-ing, then one is morally obligated to
\jf; (2) if one is morally obligated to <p, then it is possible for one to <p (Uought
implies can"); (3) if one is morally obligated to <p and is morally obligated
to \jf, then one is morally obligated to <p and to \jf (tithe agglomeration principle U50). Interestingly, DCT3's insistence that God's intentions about how
we are to act determine our moral obligations provide for a defense of all
three of these claims. (1) It is a tenet of rational intending that if one
intends the end, then one intends the means. So, if God intends that S <p,
and S's \jf-ing is necessary if S is to <p, then God (being rational) intends that
S \jf. DCT3 thus implies that if S is morally obligated to <p, and \jf-ing is a

DIVINE COMMAND, DIVINE WILL, MORAL OBLIGATION

21

necessary means to <jl-ing, then 5 is morally obligated to \If.51 (2) It is a tenet
of rational intending that one does not intend what one believes to be
impossible. If God believes that it is impossible for 5 to <jl, then it is impossible for 5 to <jl, and God (being rational) does not intend that 5 <jl. DCT3
thus implies that if 5 is morally obligated to <jl, then it is possible for 5 to <jl.
(3) It is a tenet of rational intending that one's separate intentions should
be joined into an overarching plan, a larger intention, insofar as this is possible. It follows that if God intends that 5 <jl and God intends that 5 \If, then
(being ideally rational) God intends that S both <jl and \If. DCn thus
implies that if S is morally obligated to <jl and S is morally obligated to \If,
then 5 is morally obligated both to <jl and to \If.52
The fourth consideration in favor of DCT3 as a formulation of OCT is
that it fits easily into what many divine command theorists might take to be
an attractive view of the human role in God's creative activity. God, many
theists believe, is provident: He has plans for creation, He orders things in a
particular way, He governs the world. With regard to most aspects of
God's plan, His intending can make it so. But we might think that this is
not the case with regard to those aspects of God's plan that include free
human actions: God's intending cannot simply make it the case that
humans freely do what God wills. Rather, humans will have to choose
freely to carry out the divine intentions. There is a sense, that is, in which
the fulfillment of God's plan requires human cooperation. 53 Note, though,
that this view of the human place in God's creative activity goes some way
toward making morality, as described by DCT3, intelligible within a theistic
world view: God's commands make known to humans what they need to
do in order to cooperate with God in His creative activity. This is, of course,
no decisive argument. But from a theistic perspective it may be the
strongest consideration in favor of DCT3 as the preferred formulation of
OCT that it makes morality an intelligible part of an attractive picture of the
relationship between free human agents and their provident Creator.'"
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De Veritate, 17, 3.
14. Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of
Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 14-15.
15. A non-moral analogy might make this distinction clearer. Consider the
event of a leaf's burning. The distinction between the causal role of the lit
match being in contact with the leaf and the causal role of the leaf's not being
wet corresponds to the difference between grounds of obligation (what makes
an act obligatory) and validating conditions (the circumstances in which those
grounds are able to make that act obligatory).
16. Wierenga '83, p. 390.
17. 1 do admit, though, that there is something troubling about the idea of
God's commanding us to do something that He wills that we not do.
18. Philip Quinn, "An Argument for Divine Command Ethics," in Christian
Theism and the Problems of PhiLosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990b), p. 293 (emphasis added). One might
claim that Quinn illicitly assumes that commands are equivalent to assertions
about one's will: "Perform <1>" would be, on this view, equivalent to "I will that
you <1>." These are of course not equivalent: the former is not truth-valuable,
but the latter is. But Quinn does not say that commands are assertions of will,
but that they are expressions of it. A mark of the correctness of this claim is that
a command is not sincere if one commands another to <I> but does not will that
the other <1>. Cf. Searle '69, p. 60.
19. It might be thought strange that I would continue to affix the label
"divine command theory" to the theses DCT2 and DCT3, since they place
God's ,"lill rather than God's commands as the source of moral obligation. But
it seems to me that "divine command theory" is a label used loosely to describe
any theory of morality that holds that acts of God are at the foundation of
morality; even Quiml, who explicitly favors DCT2 over DCIl, continues to call
the view he defends a divine command theory.
20. The term "metaethical" is sometimes used, particularly in the literature
on OCT, to refer only to theories of the meanings of moral terms or the characterization of moral properties. I use it more broadly than that. As I use the
terms "normative" and "meta ethical" with regard to ethical theories, a normative theory includes evaluative statements, and a metaethical theory is merely
an ethical theory that is not normative.
21. it does not follow from the fact that all acts falling under description D
are morally required that there is a moral requirement to perform acts falling
under description D. It does not even follow that if necessarily all acts falling
under description D are morally required then there is a moral requirement to
perform acts falling under description D. With regard to the former case, the
fact that each act under description 0 is morally required might be accidental;
with regard to the latter case, the set of acts falling under description D might
be necessarily coextensive with the set 01 acts falling under description E, and
there might be a moral requirement to perform acts falling under description
E. DCT2-M implies that all acts fitting the description "acting in accordance
with what God has willed that humans be required to do" are morally
required, but that does not mean that it implies that there is a moral requirement to obey God.
22. A slight complication arises with regard to DCT2-N. Suppose that to <I>
is "to do what God has willed that one be required to do"; in that case, DCT2N implies that the state of affairs of S's being morally obligated to do what God
wills that one be required to do depends on the state of affairs of God's willing
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that S be morally required to do what God wills that one be required to do. It
thus appears that if God had not willed that normative state of affairs, then it
would not have obtained; and this seems to imply that DCT2-N is a moral
requirement that God willed into existence out of normative nothingness. But
it seems to me that defenders of DCT2-N can avoid this result by restricting its
scope in a suitable way. Wierenga, who defends a version of DCT2-N, claims
that "the truth of divine command theory is independent of God. According to
the theory I am presenting, what God determines is not that the divine command theory is true, but rather what our particular obligations are .... The
general obligation to do what God commands is not, according to our theory,
imposed by God" (Wierenga '83, p. 392). His strategy is to distinguish
between act-types and act-tokens, and to hold that God is responsible only for
the moral status of act-tokens; since "doing what God wills that one be
required to do" is the name of an act-type, God is not, on Wierenga's view, to
be considered the source of the moral status of that act-type. If I were to
defend DCT2-N, I would resist Wierenga's solution: to reject the possibility
that God can assign a moral status to an act-type as such seems an unnecessarily extreme tack for the defender of DCT2-N to take. Rather, I would simply
hold that DCT2-N is a second-order moral principle in the way that Kant's
Categorical Imperative is a second-order moral principle: it assigns the status
of morally permissible or impermissible to different first-order act-types in
virtue of their conformity or lack of conformity to the act-description set out in
that second-order principle. Thus, on Kant's view, the first-order act-type
"lying" is impermissible because it is not an instance of the second-order acttype "performing a universalizable act"; and for the defender of DCT2-N, the
first-order act-type "professing one's faith" is obligatory because it is an
instance of the second-order act-type "doing what God has willed that one be
required to do."
23. Idziak discusses the historical sources for arguments from omnipotence, liberty, and impeccability in Idziak '89, pp. 51-53. See also her "Divine
Command Morality: A Guide to the Literature" in Divine Command Morality:
Historical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Idziak (New York: Edwin Mellen
Press, 1979), pp. 8-9.
24. Quinn '90b, pp. 293-294.
25. Quinn defines distinctness of states of affairs to mean that each neither
involves nor entails the other. The definitions of "involves" and "entails" that
Quinn employs are drawn from Roderick Chisholm, The First Person: An Essay
on Reference and Intentionality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1981), p. 124: "The state of affairs p involves the state of affairs q = Of. P is necessarily such that, whoever conceives it, conceives q" and "The state of affairs
p entails the state of affairs q = Of. P is necessarily such that (i) if it obtains then
q obtains and (ii) whoever accepts it accepts q."
26. Quinn '90b, p. 295.
27. Quinn '90b, p. 295.
28. Quinn '90b, p. 299. For an account of how this sort of metaphysical
dependence might be less strange than it first appears, see Thomas V. M{)rris
and Christopher Menzel, "Absolute Creation," in Morris, Anselmian
Explorations (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp.
174-176.
29. Quinn '90b, p. 298.
30. It is worth noting that it seems possible that the theist and the atheist
agree that it is morally obligatory to obey God, differing only on whether there
is such a being.
31. Perhaps a better analogy would be "It is obligatory for soldiers to obey
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their superior officers." This statement of obligation does not imply that there
are soldiers.
32. One could object: it may be true that the state of affairs described by
OCT2-N, interpreted as the claim that obedience to God (should God exist) is
obligatory, is wholly distinct from God's existing. But on another interpretation of DCT2-N, where that thesis is interpreted as the claim that obedience to
God (who does in fact exist) is obligatory, it is false that the deontological state
of affairs picked out by that thesis is wholly distinct from God's existing. I suppose this might be true. But we can say that even if this state of affairs is not
wholly distinct from God's existing, whatever is deontological about it surely is.
33. One might think that, given God's impeccability, His omnipotence
and/ or liberty could be protected only were it the case that all normative states
of affairs are contingent. It is not clear, however, that one is forced to this
result. One could hold that some such states of affairs are necessary, but their
necessity is from the divine nature, so that God's power and/or liberty is not
constrained by something distinct from God. Whether one accepts this line of
reasoning will of course depend on one's interpretations of divine omnipotence and divine liberty.
34. Though it should be noted that the argument from divine liberty seems
only to show that moral principles that apply to God's actions must depend on
the divine will.
35. Note: I say "with regard to moral matters." DCT2-M is of course controversial in itself.
36. The same line of reasoning can be spelled out with regard to the arguments from omnipotence, liberty, and impeccability.
37. Another way to put this is to say that if this is the only version of OCT
that is defensible, then DCT should not be considered a contestant among
moral theories, but rather simply a claim about morality generated by certain
theological doctrines.
38. Note that this way of trying to make OCT distinctive does not distinguish the intuitionist that takes the doctrine of divine sovereignty seriously
from the defender of OCT2-M. This might not be an objection, though; perhaps once we are able to distinguish DCT from a number of other moral views
to which theists have been sympathetic, like natural law theory, Kantianism,
and utilitarianism, that the best version of DCT turns out to be a theistic variant
of one particular moral theory is not such bad news.
39. Some - a very few - might hold that a proper understanding of divine
sovereignty does commit one to a direct dependence view in physics and ethics
alike. To hold such a direct dependence view with regard to the natural order is
to affirm occasionalism, the doctrine that "God is the only cause of [natural] phenomena. In other words, loccasionalists1 have denied that there is any such
thing as genuine secondary (i.e., creaturely) causation in nature" (Alfred J.
Freddoso, "Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation
in Nature," in Thomas Morris, ed., Divine and Human Actio1l: Essays in the
Metaphysics of Theism [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 19881, pp. 74118, p. 76). As Freddoso points out, some theistic philosophers have been
attracted to this view because for them it is the only account of the relationship
between God and nature that does justice to God's complete sovereignty over
creation (Freddoso '88, p. 74-77). Very few philosophers find occasionalism at
all attractive, however; indeed, even Quinn himself explicitly rejects occasionalism as the best account of God's relationship to the natural order, arguing that
his own moderate "conservationist" view "can avoid being tarred with the ugly
brush of occasionalism" (Quinn, "Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and
Occasionalism," in Divine and Human Action, pp. 50-73, p. 73).
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40. Adams alludes to this worry in Adams 79, p. 76.
41. It might be thought that a quicker and more intuitively appealing argument for the "what God intends, God gets" thesis can be made in terms of
God's omnipotence: if God intends some state of affairs, then God's being allpowerful guarantees that this state of affairs will obtain. Even assuming that
God intends nothing impossible (an assumption that would require mention of
God's rationality if it were to be defended), this argument would fall short if it
is true, as it has been argued by Alvin Plantinga, that there are some possible
worlds that even an omnipotent God could not have actualized. To assume
that God could actualize all possible worlds is to commit "Leibniz's Lapse";
see Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 184.
42. Quinn allows for this possibility in his thorough account of how axiological terms can be given a OCT interpretation; he refers to states of affairs
such that God wishes that they obtain and that God wishes that they fail to
obtain as "extraordinary." See Quinn 78, p. 69.
43. Note that if one thinks that there cannot be conflicting moral obligations, this might be a reason to want something like the intention interpretation
of God's willing: for it is irrational to have intentions that are not mutually satisfiable, and God is not irrational; hence, God has no conflicting intentions.
There could therefore not be conflicting moral obligations. As we will see, the
interpretation of DCT3 that I defend below preserves this result.
44. As Quinn in fact does in Quinn 78, pp. 67-71.
45. 1 Timothlf 2:3-4.
46. In the first explanation, Aquinas (following Augustine) suggests that all
that is meant by the claim that God wills all to be saved is that there is no saved
person that God did not will to be saved; in the second, he suggests that the
claim might be construed as asserting that there are some humans of all conditions that God wills to be saved, not as asserting that God wills that all humans
of all conditions be saved. See ST la 19,6 ad 1.
47. Aquinas, ST la 19,6 ad 1.
48. Aquinas, ST la 19, 6 ad 1.
49. It might be wondered why we would want to ascribe antecedent intentions to God, or to any other agent. It seems to me that the rationale for ascribing such intentions to an agent is both to explain that agent's consequent intentions and to ground the truth-values of counterfactual claims about what that
agent would intend were the circumstances of action different.
50. Bernard Williams discusses (and names) the agglomeration principle in
his "Ethical Consistency," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973), pp. 180-182.
51. Doesn't OCTl have this implication, since, as I pointed out, one can reason about the necessary means to fulfilling commands? The answer is no.
Suppose that one has a moral obligation to <il, and by reasoning discovers that
\jf-ing is a necessary means to <il-ing; nevertheless, he or she does not \jf. OCT1
implies only that the moral obligation to <il has been broken; not \j1-ing only
guarantees that the obligation to <il will not be kept. Only by adding a moral
premise to DCTl - that if one is morally required to <il, then one is morally
required to perform any act that is a necessary means to <il-ing - can one conclude that one is morally required to \jf in such a case. DCT3, on the other
hand, does not require an additional moral premise to achieve this result: it
relies only on a premise about God's rational intending.
52. These points are indebted to Christopher Gowans' intention-prescriptivist arguments for the agglomeration and "ought implies can" principles in
Innocence Lost: A Defense of Inescapable Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), pp. 65-85. Note that if DCT3 is true, then there cannot be moral
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dilemmas: for moral dilemmas require inconsistent ultima facie moral obligations, the presence of which would entail that Cod has inconsistent intentions.
But since Cod is not irrational, Cod does not have inconsistent intentions.
One might object that since antecedent intentions can be inconsistent without irrationality, one cannot employ the claim that Cod's rationality precludes
inconsistent antecedent intentions in rejecting the possibility of moral dilemmas. One might say, for example, that Cod would clearly be rational to intend
both that persons' legs not be amputated and that physicians amputate when
necessary to save the patient's life; but since there are obviously cases in which
these antecedent intentions are inconsistent - sometimes the only way for
physicians to save life is to amputate - it cannot be true that rationality precludes having inconsistent antecedent intentions. But this sort of example
need not provide a case of inconsistent intentions. Either these antecedent
intentions are ascribed to God in abstraction from its being the case that sometimes physicians must amputate in order to save life, or they are not. If they
are, then there is no inconsistency involved: for, abstracting from the sometime
necessity for amputation, these intentions are co-realizable. If they are not,
then there is an inconsistency involved: God intends that both of these states of
affairs obtain, but these states of affairs cannot both obtain in a world where it
is sometimes necessary for physicians to amputate in order to save their
patients' lives. God would be irrational to possess both of these intentions in
light of this circumstance. Thus, this sort of case provides no reason to think
that a rational God could possess inconsistent antecedent intentions. But cases
of genuine moral dilemmas must, according to DCT3, involve inconsistent
antecedent intentions. Since according to DCT3's interpretation of ultima facie
obligations, all such obligations depend on God's antecedent intentions that
abstract only from what the agent actually chooses to do, unavoidable moral
wrongdoing could arise only from God's possessing inconsistent intentions, a
state of affairs that is precluded by Cod's eminent rationality.
53. For discussions of human cooperation with Cod from the perspective
of natural law theory, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 409, and Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John
Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," American
Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987), pp. 143-145.
54. lowe thanks to Robert Adams, William Alston, Trenton Merricks,
Philip Quinn, and Thomas Williams, whose comments and criticisms made
this paper better than it otherwise would have been.

